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Abstract. Agents in a multi-agent environment must often cooperate to achieve
their objectives. In this paper an agent, B, cooperates with another agent, A, if B
adopts a goal that furthers A's objectives in the environment. If agents are
independent and motivated by their own interests, cooperation cannot be relied
upon and it may be necessary for A to persuade B to adopt a cooperative goal. This
paper is concerned with the organisation and construction of persuasive argument,
and examines how a rational agent comes to hold a belief, and thus, how new
beliefs might be engendered and existing beliefs altered, through the process of
argumentation. Argument represents an opportunity for an agent to convince a
possibly sceptical or resistant audience of the veracity of its own beliefs. This
ability is a vital component of rich communication, facilitating explanation,
instruction, cooperation and conflict resolution. An architecture is described in
which a hierarchical planner is used to develop discourse plans which can be
realised in natural language using the LOLITA system. Planning is concerned with
the intentional, contextual and pragmatic aspects of discourse structure as well as
with the logical form of the argument and its stylistic organisation. In this paper
attention is restricted to the planning of persuasive discourse, or monologue.
Keywords: agent communication, argumentation theory, rhetoric, belief modelling,
planning.
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1. Introduction
In this paper an architecture is presented for the autonomous construction of
argument, outlining the components required for persuasive communication.
Argument plays a crucial role in multi-agent worlds in which agents are motivated to
pursue their own interests. The focus of this work is restricted to logical argument,
and the assumption is made that agents will adopt, or reject, certain beliefs if they are
presented with convincing reasons to do so. Rhetorical argument, which has been
pursued in the context of multi-agent communication [20], is difficult to model
because its success depends on the inability of the hearer to recognise the fallacy it
depends upon. It is assumed in this work that agents can both construct and follow
logical argument.
The architecture described here is intended as a model of communication
between two artificial agents, although it also models a restricted form of inter-
human communication and human-computer interaction. The realisation of the
planned discourses must result in their expression in some language. In this work,
natural language has been chosen as an example because generation of natural
language texts from planned monologues has been explored successfully in the
LOLITA system [18]. The proposed architecture is not inextricably bound to the use
of natural language - the planning levels are independent of the language in which
plans will be expressed and the intentional structures produced at these levels are
sufficiently abstract to remain unchanged by a shift to some more simple and
restrictive artificial language.
2. Overview
The architecture described in this paper is hierarchical in structure, reflecting the
distinct, though inter-related, levels of structure within arguments. The part of
argument synthesis which is concerned with the resolution of syntax, expression and
morphology comprises the lowest level of the architecture and represents the
interface to the LOLITA system. Above this lowest level sits functionality based upon
Mann & Thompsons’s Rhetorical Structure Theory [11], and then above this is a
hierarchy of levels concerned with the planning and presentation of the discourse.
The highest level of abstraction in the architecture is the Argument Objectives (AO)
level which determines the overall form of argument to be constructed. Three forms
are considered: an agent can explain, inform or persuade. Informing the hearer of a
proposition simply involves stating the proposition without the support of argument.
It is assumed that the hearer had no knowledge of the proposition prior to being
informed. Explaining a proposition involves providing support for the proposition
through argument, under the assumption that the hearer knew of the proposition but
was undecided about its truth value prior to the explanation. Persuading a hearer to
accept a proposition involves undermining the hearer's current beliefs in the falsity of
the proposition and then the provision of support for belief in the truth of the
proposition. It is assumed that the hearer believes in the converse before the
persuasion takes place. As this account suggests, a four-valued model of belief is used
in the architecture described here. An agent either believes, disbelieves, is unaware of
or is undecided about a proposition. This model is described and justified in §3.
The persuade and explain argument forms are developed at the Argument
Structure (AS) level which produces the logical form of the argument, employing
purely intentional data structures, by the application of operators modelling logical
inference rules. This form is then augmented and modified by the subordinate
Eloquence Generation (EG) level which is concerned with properties of a speech
such as its length, detail, meter, ordering of sub-arguments, grouping of sub-
arguments, enthymeme contraction, use of repetition and so on. The architecture is
summarised in Fig. 1. A collection of operators describing the actions which may be
employed at the different levels in argument construction are supplied to a
hierarchical planner which plans firstly an intentional structure (an abstracted model
of the intended discourse), which is then supplemented with further details to form a
deeper content structure, linking the intentions to rhetorical structures for realisation.
These structures are supplemented with the addition of constraints on textual
realisation, including vocabulary restrictions, rhythm and mood of text and so on.
This is finally realised as text.
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Fig. 1. System architecture overview
3. Belief Modelling
3.1. Issues
It has become clear that both AS and EG levels require access to the belief model of
the audience, in addition, of course, to the beliefs of the system. The AS level needs
to be able to assess in advance how different structures are likely to be received, and
to take account of the beliefs of the audience in producing structure. The EG level
employs the belief model to pitch an argument at the right level of detail, and to track
the saliency of beliefs used during argumentation. A more detailed examination of
the relationship between the higher levels and belief is described below in §4 and §5.
There are a number of issues involved in analysing belief. There are
different kinds of belief. These will be referred to in this paper as factual beliefs,
which are either testable (at least in theory) or are definitional (and include beliefs
based on sensory experiences); opinions, which are based on moral and aesthetic
judgement and are thus ultimately personal and unprovable (since there is no
universally accepted and provably correct aesthetic-moral framework - and it is hard
to conceive how there could be); and cultural beliefs, which are based upon
sociocultural maxims (such as that which states that living into old age is desirable).
This tripartite distinction has been based upon the views expressed implicitly by [3],
when talking about general types of argument, but there are also numerous other
divisions which could be detailed (see [1] for a number of examples). The way in
which beliefs become manifest in argumentative dialogue - both their individual
expression, and their interrelation - is chiefly dependent upon their class, so
competent representation and recognition of these distinct belief types represents an
important problem. A further discussion of these divisions and their implications is
pursued in §3.2.
Another major problem is how to resolve two seemingly contradictory views
generated by introspection, that of whether beliefs are best represented as
dichotomous or scalar. Various problems associated with the concept of 'strength of
belief' are discussed in [7]. A pragmatic resolution to this issue is in itself crucial to
competent belief modelling.
A simple, but powerful, way to model beliefs is to say that an agent believes
a proposition in a given context if that agent would be prepared to act on that
proposition in that context. Action might take different forms reflecting different
levels of commitment on the part of the agent to the implications of believing in the
proposition. For example, action on the belief that lottery winnings should be
distributed amongst the poor can range from simply claiming this belief to taking
actions in the world which bring about the redistribution of individuals' winnings.
Using this model, given a context, an agent can be said to believe, disbelieve or be
undecided about a given proposition with respect to a given action.
In the current work, agents co-existing within an environment communicate
in order to engage in co-operative activity. An agent, A, will attempt to persuade an
agent, B, to adopt a certain goal. This objective can be achieved if A can persuade B
to adopt beliefs which will result in B generating the goal A intends. In simple cases
A will only need to make B believe that A wishes the goal to be adopted. This will
occur in situations in which adoption of the goal will imply little planning and
execution effort on the part of B, with no conflicts with B's existing goals. When
achievement of the goal demands significant effort from B, or conflicts with B's
existing goals, more complex beliefs might need to be induced. For example, B might
need to be persuaded that achievement of the goal will result in benefits for B as well
as for A. In the current work, monologue, and not dialogue, is being considered, and
hence the contexts in which beliefs are held and the goal which A hopes that B will
adopt are fixed so that beliefs can be treated as three-valued (believed, disbelieved or
undecided), as proposed above.
Since A plans its monologue relative to its own model of B's beliefs, the
beliefs that B actually holds are not accessible to A and cannot be considered relevant
in the construction of  A's monologue. Furthermore, it is possible for A to believe that
B is ignorant of certain propositions, which precludes the possibility of B having any
belief attitude (that is, any of the three values identified above) towards these
propositions in A's model of B. In this case, A will believe B to be unaware of the
proposition - a different relationship to belief, disbelief or indecision.
Another property of belief which is manifest in argument is that of saliency.
Enthymeme contraction (where an implicit premise or conclusion is omitted) relies
heavily upon saliency and so too does the process of focusing: keeping the argument
to the point (Cf. the lower level focusing of [8]). The belief model used must
therefore be able to competently handle the concept of saliency.
Argument modelling also relies on a treatment of the complex phenomenon
of mutual belief: an argument is based upon common ground - a set of mutual beliefs
(ie. which both parties hold, and which both parties also know the other to hold).
Mutual belief is defined in terms of an infinite regress of nested beliefs. That is, A
believes that A and B mutually believe a proposition, P, if A believes (i) P and (ii)
that B believes P and (iii) that A and B mutually believe that A and B mutually
believe P. The problem is to pragmatically choose a level of nesting beyond which
'mutual' belief is to be assumed. In making this choice, it is understood that no matter
how many levels a system can cope with, it is always possible to construct a (highly
convoluted) example which exceeds the capabilities of that system. From a
psychological (and intuitive) point of view, choosing some arbitrary level of nesting
by which to define mutuality seems rather implausible. In humans, it would appear
that belief nesting is a resource bounded operation with no known limit, and it is
possible to construct deeply nested examples which present remarkably little
difficulty (such as the example in Fig. 2, below), though handling further complexity
rapidly becomes extremely difficult and time consuming. It may be possible to utilise
In the classic Hitchcock film "North by Northwest", Cary Grant is the central character in a case of mistaken 
identity - he is mistaken for a goodguy agent by the evil James Mason. Towards the end, a scene occurs in which 
CG masquerades as the goodguy agent he is thought to be. As part of a goodguy ploy, he informs JM of his wish 
to defect, at which he is shot by EveMarie Saint, a goodguy agent working undercover as accomplice to JM. Inher 
role as a villain, she needs to stop the defection, believing him to be a traitor to the goodguys. Thus with the 
proposition P that 'ES is a goodguy',
BEL(ES, P)
BEL(CG, P)
BEL(ES, BEL(CG, ~P))
BEL(CG, BEL(ES, BEL(CG, ~P)))
BEL(Audience, BEL(CG, BEL(ES, BEL(CG, ~P))))
She knows she's a goodguy
He knows she's a goodguy ...
... but she doesn't realise that ...
... and he knows she doesn't realise ...
... or at least that's what the audience thinks!
After JM has left however, CG gets up - the shooting had been faked. CG and ES must have been in league  with 
each other after  all. At this point the belief held must be changed to
BEL(Audience, BMB(CG, ES, P)))) They both know she's a goodguy, and 
both know that they both know it.
Hitchcock envisaged the whole situation and realised that it was unusual and interesting. There were in total, five 
levels of nested beliefs.
Fig. 2. Deep nesting of beliefs
this evidence and allow for a similar process in an implementation, so that some
default operator (say, BMB, following [4]) is employed using a naively shallow level
of nesting, but, in the light of new evidence, this may be replaced (or supplemented)
with a more sophisticated nesting and appropriate operator.
3.2. Grounding of Beliefs
The knowledge representation adopted as the basis for this system has as a
fundamental unit the concept of an event. An event is a piece of information
representing a proposition which is perceived to be a part of reality: for example, "the
sky is blue". The constituent elements of an event are the subject, the predicate and
the object. It is possible for the object to be absent as in "the bomb exploded". If
necessary, further features can be added, such as the time or the location of the event.
This form of knowledge representation constitutes the basis for the semantic network
on which the LOLITA system depends [18]. An example of such a network is given
below in Fig. 3. The representation is reified so that events can themselves be the
subject of events, with transformation being possible of the links between events
(which represent various possible relations, such as implication or causation) so that
these are also accessible as events. The events encoded within the knowledge base of
an agent represent the beliefs held by that agent. The events can be representations of
(the agents beliefs about) another agent's beliefs, allowing one agent to model the
beliefs of another. An account of the semantics of the basic framework of the
representation can be found in [17].
Explosion
Explosion
to explode Bomb
to go off Bomb
Place 9 p.m.
Synonym
Action
Location Time
Subject
Universal
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Rank: individual
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Fig. 3. “The bomb exploded”
In order to persuade another agent to adopt a belief, it is important to
understand what might lead to the adoption.  Beliefs are not held without reason: the
reasons for an agent holding a belief are captured as the supports for that belief. In
the LOLITA representation, this can be seen as a special event relationship holding
between an event, E, and its supporter, E', namely: Supports(E', E). The presence of
the pair of events in a network corresponding to the beliefs, or perceived beliefs, of
an agent, E' and Supports(E', E), can be seen as sanctioning the inference that the
event E holds.
The supports for a belief are of great importance, since it is the supports
which allow an agent to decompose an argument into sub-arguments, through the
identification of the supporting components which must be introduced into the main
argument. Supporting relationships are established in the initial knowledge of the
agent - the current work is not concerned with attempting to infer them from
observations of the world or even from implicit relationships within the initial
knowledge of the agent. The supports can be related to the event they support in
different ways, but the two that have been considered so far are implicational
relationships and causal relationships. In order for the recursive structure of events
and their supports to terminate it is clear that there must be events which do not
require support. These events are of great interest, since it is apparent that they
represent premises of an argument and could prove difficult to persuade other agents
to accept. It is therefore worth attempting to identify the nature of these events and
determine why they might have no supports.
Events which have no supporting events are referred to in this work as
grounded events. Grounded events can be grounded for several reasons. One key
reason is that an agent will trust its own sensory input (which is not the same as the
interpretation of that input). So, if the agent believes it has experienced some
particular sensory experience, then the event representing that experience will be
unsupported - it is grounded by virtue of the sensory experience itself. These events
are a special case of a more general type of grounded event: the events which are
grounded through external sources. In the case of sensory experience the external
source is the sensory capacity of the agent itself, but, more generally, the source
might be another agent. Of course, events which are sourced by another agent are
(certainly for human agents, at least) only admitted into an agent's beliefs via its
senses and it is possible to argue that the grounding of all events which have external
sources must therefore be through sensory experiences. In practice it is not
particularly helpful to distinguish the sensory event from the literal interpretation of
that event when considering information provided by another agent: the question of
the status of the content of the information (whether or not the content is accepted as
a belief or not) is determined on the basis of an estimation of the reliability of the
source agent, not on whether the senses that conveyed the message are considered
reliable.
There is a further category of grounded events: some beliefs are held not
because of a direct external source, but because of internal motivations and value-
systems of an agent. An agent might believe that it is deemed punishable to carry out
some action - this would be an externally sourced belief, grounded through the source
from which it was obtained - but a belief that the action is wrong can only be based
on the agent's own moral code. Events which are believed because of the agent's own
value-system are considered to be grounded through that value-system. The
distinction between events which are grounded through the agent's experience of the
world and those which are grounded through the agent's value-system reflects the
division of beliefs discussed earlier into factual beliefs and opinions.
Many beliefs are supported by a combination of grounded beliefs and causal
relationships which reflect the way in which an agent believes the world works. For
example, a belief that a ball is under a table might be supported by the grounded
belief that the agent saw the ball roll slowly under the table and a (complex) belief
that objects which are rolling slowly will quickly stop and stay where they come to
rest. The first belief is grounded in sensory perception. The second belief (which
might, in fact, be a structure of several interlocking beliefs) is a belief about the way
that the world works. It is more difficult to assess the status of this belief: it is not
grounded in experience, since a causal relationship cannot be experienced. It is
unlikely to be sourced by a single information source: if it were, it might prove
dangerously volatile, being susceptible to possible future revisions of the reliability of
the source. Beliefs about the physical laws of the world in which an agent works are
neither sourced by individual sensory experiences (although they can, of course, be
undermined by single sensory experiences), nor is it likely that they are sourced by
another agent. Further, these beliefs are not opinions - they do not reflect a value-
judgement. Therefore, it must be possible for an agent to ground beliefs in one
further way: beliefs about physical laws are grounded as hypotheses. That is, some
beliefs are adopted because they represent working hypotheses from which
deductions about the way the world will behave can be drawn, predictions made and
control of the environment derived. In the tradition of falsificationism [13], these
hypotheses survive until they can be bettered, or until demonstrated to be false.
Finally, there are beliefs which are a priori beliefs about the ontological
status of the terms used in the construction of the beliefs. For example, agents will
have beliefs about the meaning of elements such as part-of relationships. These
beliefs are partly expressed in a declarative form, and, more importantly, partly
procedurally, within the algorithms which manipulate the knowledge. Beliefs of this
form will be assumed to be shared knowledge agreed upon by all parties to a
monologue, since misunderstandings about the meaning of terms cannot be resolved
in the scope of a monologue.
Having considered the various ways in which events can be grounded, it is
now possible to consider the consequences of these alternatives for argument
construction. Any unsupported event can be proposed to another agent by simply
asserting it, in the hope that the agent will adopt it as an event sourced by the
asserting agent. The adoption will depend on the assessment of the source agent's
reliability on the information content according to the listening agent. In some cases
this will prove adequate, but when adoption of the belief by the listening agent
implies the generation and achievement of goals the reliability of the source agent
might not be sufficient to lead to adoption of the belief. In this case, various strategies
are possible according to the grounding of the event in the source agent's beliefs. If
the event is grounded through being sourced by a third party, then an "appeal to
authority" is possible, in which the third party is invoked as a source in the hope that
this source will have the necessary reliability in the assessment of the listener to
cause adoption of the belief. If the event is grounded through sensory experience then
providing more detail of the context for the sensory experience can serve to improve
the assessment of the reliability of the agent as a source, leading to acceptance of the
veracity of the experience and the event it yields. If the event is a hypothesis about a
physical law then an "appeal to the people" might be appropriate, if the law is a
widely accepted one. Otherwise, demonstration of the predictive power of the law and
a description of the testing to which it has been subjected will provide support for its
adoption. Finally, opinions which rest purely on the value-system of the agent will
prove the most difficult to persuade another agent to adopt. At present, these beliefs
are handled by simply proposing them as premises to be accepted or rejected entirely
at the listener's discretion. It is considered that argument founded on moral or ethical
judgements are amongst the most difficult to uphold and the most bitterly contested
of arguments.
4. Argument Objectives and Structure
The objectives of an argument will depend on the perceived beliefs of the hearer with
respect to the belief that it is intended to convey. If the hearer is ignorant of the
event, then simply informing the hearer of the event might be sufficient to have it
adopted. If the hearer is aware of the event, but is undecided about whether to believe
it, then it will be necessary to provide the hearer with supports from which to build a
belief in the target event. Finally, if the hearer disbelieves the event then the objective
of the argument will be to persuade the hearer to accept the event. If the hearer
disbelieves the target event then the hearer must believe at least one event which is in
contradiction with belief in the target event - this is an event-complement. This will
be achieved by identifying supports that the hearer has for the beliefs in the event-
complements (in the speaker's model of the hearer's beliefs) and systematically
undermining these, before building supports for the belief that is intended to supplant
the complementary belief originally held by the hearer. The new supports can be
provided through explanation, unless the hearer believes in the complement of these
events, in which case persuasive argument must again be employed. This coarse
structure forms the foundation on which the argument structure can be built, and
reflects the division into subarguments components developed in the AS level.
Through an analysis of a corpus of arguments drawn from a number of the
sources mentioned in §2, the following structure has been identified:
(1) an argument consists of one or more premises and exactly one conclusion
(2) a premise can be a subargument (which itself consists of one or more
premises and exactly one conclusion: the conclusion then stands as the
premise in the superargument)
(3) a subargument is an integral unit whose components cannot be referred to
from elsewhere, nor can the conclusion of a subargument rest upon premises
extraneous to that subargument
(4) the only exception to (3) is where a conclusion in a distant subargument is
restated locally as a premise
Analyses based on similar theories are performed in many texts: see for example,
[25]. It is this structure which the AS level constructs, linking premises to
conclusions through the use of two groups of operators: standard logical relations and
inductively reasoned implications.
The first group comprises the standard rules of inference of classical logic.
In the second group there are the inductive operators which are of three types:
inductive generalisation, causal and analogical (eg. [10]). All three will have
preconditions that are again tightly specified for context and belief, but with the
additional constraint of the 'criteria of inductive strength', ie. the requirements for
their application to produce an inductively strong argument.
A third group, not considered in this work, is the rhetorical fallacies, such as
red herrings, straw men or false dichotomies. Although these fallacies have a role in
natural language argument generation, they complicate the model of argument
significantly, not least because of the necessary accompanying assumption that the
audience does not have the powers of analysis to unmask the fallacies, leading to
questions about the more general abilities of the audience to follow an argument
where it is correctly structured. Further discussion of these fallacies can be found in
[14].
5. Eloquence Generation
Although the EG level also employs a number of operators, the bulk of its
functionality is based on the application of heuristics. The first task of the EG level is
to control stylistic presentation, comprising a number of relatively low level
modifications such as the vocabulary range, syntactic construction and the frequency
of specific devices such as repetition. There are a large number of such factors
detailed in the stylistic literature - see [16] for an overview, although these are
intended to apply to human audiences with sophisticated appreciation of the stylistic
phenomena. To date, such factors have been controlled by quite artificial and
simplistic means, typically, the user setting a number of variables to particular values
(eg. [22]). For the instantiations to be made and altered 'on-the-fly', the EG level
must refer to a body of parameters, in addition to the belief model of the audience
and context, all of which are modified dynamically. Within LOLITA, a powerful
low-level plan realisation system exists which realises components of the semantic
network as text, governed by stylistic parameters. This system is flexible and robust,
allowing a wide-ranging control over text-generation while separating stylistic and
content issues from the problems of grammatical correctness and syntactic
construction [19].
One vitally important parameter affecting the argument is the relationship
which the speaker wishes to create or maintain with the hearer. This relationship is
established through stylistic rather than structural means, and is not necessarily
divorced from other aims: if a hearer accepts the speaker's authoritative stance, for
example, the speaker may be able to use the relationship to reinforce his statements
(by increasing the hearer's assessment of the agent's reliability). Attempts at
instigating different relationships between speaker and hearer account (at least in
part) for a number of complex phenomena - humour, for example, is frequently used
to establish the speaker as a friend (and therefore reliable and truthful). Such
phenomena do not fall inside the scope of this work.
Some of the EG heuristics rely on the general principles of argument
formation (though others make use of factors such as tone and rhythm). There are
three possible statement orderings in an argument: pre-order (C P*), post-order (P*
C), and hybrid order (P* C P*). The first is usually used where the P* are examples
(in the case of factual conclusions: for opinions, the P* would often be analogies),
especially when the hearer is being led to a hasty generalisation from the P* to the C.
Pre-order is also used when the initial conclusion is deliberately provocative - the
construction being used to draw attention to the argument (and consequently it is
unusual to find a weak argument structured with the pre-order ordering). It can also
be forced, should a premise not be accepted by the hearer, and require a sub-
argument in its support. Post-order is the usual choice for longer, more complex or
less convincing arguments (indeed some arguments are less convincing precisely
because they are longer or more complex). It is also used for 'thin end of the wedge'
argument and for grouping together premises which individually lend only very weak
support to the conclusion. The hybrid construction is rarer, usually occurring when
the speaker has completed an post-order argument which has not been accepted and
therefore requires further support.
Finally, there are a number of features controlled by the EG level which lie
somewhere between the stylistic and the rhetoric: artifices such as repetition and
alliteration can prove extremely effective in constructing eloquent and compelling
argument. It is interesting to note that almost all of EG heuristics are devices listed
by classical texts as figures and tropes. Indeed this is a uniquely interesting property
of the EG level: the emphasis it puts in utilisation of ideas posited in
precomputational treatises, especially the classical texts of Cicero and Aristotle ([6],
for example) and the ideas developed in the late middle ages and renaissance ([23]
and [3] have been used as source material for much of the analysis). This fact poses
unique challenges as well as affording unique advantages: on the one hand, the ideas
are clear and unbiased, whilst on the other, may be difficult to transcribe to
implementation.
6. Intention
Recent research has clearly shown that intention, or motivation,  plays a crucial role
in the generation of discourse, due to its key role in justification, explanation, failure
recovery, self referential discourse and response to follow-up questioning [12], [26].
The framework proposed here employs intentions at every level of processing. At the
highest level, intention is represented through the use of communicative goals
(following Moore and Paris, [12]). An entire argument may ultimately rest upon a
single intention such as believes(H, P). At the AS level, then, an abstract plan is
produced which fulfils this top level goal. In contrast to Moore and Paris,
communicative goals are not necessarily resolved into linguistic (ie. non-intention)
goals. Rather, intentions can give rise both to linguistic structures and more refined
intention structures. For example, the stylised description of the Modus Ponens
operator, as used at the AS level, fulfils the postcondition believes(H, P) by
introducing two new communicative goals, believes(H, X) and believes(H, implies(X,
P)).
Modus Ponens
Shell: Preconditions: believes(H, X)
believes(H, implies (X, P))
Add: believes(H, P)
Delete: disbelieves(H, P)
Fig 4. Modus Ponens Operator Shell
It would be a dangerous oversimplification to assume that the MP step of an
argument is simply a matter of stating the two premises followed by the conclusion,
as might be inferred from Fig. 4. At a high level, there do exist the intentions for the
hearer to believe X and implies(X, P) - this is part of the ‘intention structure’
described in Fig. 1. However, that intention structure undergoes heavy modification
before being communicated.
At the AS level, then, intentions are substrate to the planning process; they
form goals which are used in pre- and post-condition lists. At the EG level, most
intentions play a rather different role, due to the difference in processing styles
between the AS and EG. In particular, planning at the EG level primarily involves
the use of maintenance goals, which affect the plan structure in a heuristic manner
(as opposed to the more conventional achievement goals planned for and fulfilled at
the AS level). For example, a typical EG level heuristic (implemented as a
maintenance goal intention) blocks plan fragments which tell the hearer something
they already know. In the example above, where the AS level suggests (in the body of
the MP operator) uttering X, implies(X, P) and P, the EG level might remove the
first premise if the hearer belief model indicated that the hearer already believed X.
The RST level also needs to maintain a representation of intention, and the
proposed framework facilitates the adoption of the approach put forward by [12],
wherein intentions map on a one-to-one basis with presentational relations and on a
many-to-many basis with subject matter relations.
The  hierarchical nature of the planning process means that the final surface
structure communicated to the hearer is fully justified in terms of high level
intentions, so that should explanation, justification or recovery be required, the
system has recourse back to appropriate intentions with which to replan.
7. Planning Discourse
If the structure of knowledge alone is considered when planning discourse, it would
appear that the planning task is not particularly difficult. This is because, given the
initial assumption that the agent is not to deliberately mislead its audience and that
its knowledge is consistent (or, rather, that once an inconsistency is discovered no
argument will proceed founded on the inconsistent knowledge), operators that
describe the argument process have a monotonic behaviour. That is, operators can be
applied to shift the beliefs of an audience in only one direction: from disbelief
through uncertainty to belief, or, conversely, from belief towards disbelief.
The role that planning plays in discourse construction is in the development
and maintenance of coherence as the discourse develops. A speaker must present the
components of an argument in a way that allows related elements to be connected in
the hearer's knowledge. An argument cannot proceed by giving pieces of information
in a disconnected and arbitrary way. It is necessary to organise the argument in a way
that emphasises its structure and allows the hearer to identify the inferential structure
and draw the appropriate inferences. This observation is reflected in the design of
planning operators for the discourse planning domain. Operators affect not only the
models of the state of the knowledge of the hearer but also the model of the hearer's
view of the monologue, including its current focus, direction and intended purpose.
The planner used by the system described here is a hierarchical planner
based on the use of operator abstraction and encapsulation [5]. It works by
constructing a hierarchy of abstract plans, connected together by a special operation
called refinement. The hierarchical structure of the plan development process
corresponds to the organisation of the AO, AS and EG levels within the argument-
planning framework. Most of the planning effort is concentrated within the AO and
AS levels, with plan-post-processing being carried out during eloquence generation,
which involves resolving previously unconstrained orderings between subarguments
and the addition of stylistic elements to the plan structure based on the contextual
information inherited from the AO and AS levels encoded within the plan structure.
Abstract plans developed initially at the AO level and refined during the AS
planning phase, shape the development of the final discourse by imposing increasing
structure on the inter-relationships between components of the developing discourse.
An abstract plan can be seen as a skeletal discourse, in which the overall structure is
in place but none of the details of the argument have been planned. Refinement to
more detailed planning levels, which is only performed when an abstract plan has
been completed (that is, has no outstanding goals), must preserve the structure
provided by the abstract plan. As a consequence of this, many choices which might
have been considered during planning of an argument at the detailed level can be
pruned as they become inconsistent with the abstract plan. Abstraction therefore
assists in the planning of a complex argument by converging on a detailed argument
from above. There is a great deal of evidence in the literature that this form of
abstraction can considerably improve the performance of a classical planner [2].
Planners based on operator abstraction are characterised by the use of
abstract operators which achieve an abstract effect and can be refined into the more
detailed components that contribute towards these effects. Abstract operators contain
some internal structure indicating what goals have to be achieved, or actions added,
to achieve these abstract effects. The first planner to use operator abstraction was
NOAH, [15], in which a plan was constructed as a procedural network composed of
nodes representing operators and goals, and arcs representing temporal relations.
When an operator is applied, its internal structure, consisting of goals to be achieved
and actions to be applied, is added immediately to the network. NOAH is widely used
as a basis for discourse and dialogue planning [9], and similar approaches were also
adopted in NONLIN, [21], and SIPE, [24]. In the system described here, operator
abstraction is used together with encapsulation which prevents the internal structures
of abstract operators from being revealed before the contexts in which they will be
interpreted have been constructed. Here, abstract operators are added to a plan as if
they were primitive and only refined to reveal their hidden structures when the plan
itself is completed and ready to be refined.
Operators have a shell and a body. The shell is visible at the planning level
in which the operator is applied, and contains the preconditions and effects of the
operator. The body contains a partial order on a set of goals which, when achieved
after refinement of the plan, will combine to achieve the effects of the abstract
operator. When a plan is refined it is necessary to tie together the local contents of
the individual bodies to ensure that they maintain any relationships between the
abstract operators in the plan prior to refinement. Thus, if the operators P and Q were
ordered so that P precedes Q in the abstract plan, and P achieves a precondition for Q
and, after refinement, P has been replaced by the goals p1 and p2 and Q has been
replaced by the goals q1 and q2, it is necessary to have some way of insisting that the
effect of p2 must last beyond the point in time at which Q was applied in the abstract
plan. This coordination is achieved by the refinement operation of the planner and
involves only linear work in the size of the abstract plan. Bodies of abstract operators
contain only goals: not including plan steps in the bodies of operators ensures a fully
flexible exploitation of context after refinement, so that unnecessary plan steps are
not introduced.
An important feature of the abstraction mechanism offered by the planner
used here is that different levels of abstraction can be characterised by different
granularities of description. This allows the world, and the effects upon it which an
agent wishes to bring about, to be expressed in terms of coarse-grained categories and
relationships. For example: in the Towers of Hanoi domain towers of discs can be
moved from peg to peg, and these moves will refine into many disc-moving
operations at a later point in the development of the plan. In the blocks-world, towers
can be transformed into different towers in two steps - destruction of the existing
tower and construction of the new tower. These two steps will eventually refine into
many carefully ordered block unstacking and stacking operations. In the construction
of argument a coarse-grained argument to persuade a hearer to accept a proposition P
might take the following form: Identify supports for Not(P), undermine one or more
supports, explain reasons for belief in supports for P, inform about the causal link
between supports and P. Following many levels of refinement this will result in a
detailed argument in support of P, ready for realisation in an expressive language. It
is possible for propositions of different granularities to co-exist within a plan, since
the planner does not follow a rigidly hierarchical pattern of development within the
AO, AS and EG levels, and the planner is equipped with mechanisms to detect and
control their interaction [5].
The following operator is intended to give an example of how the beliefs of
a speaker and hearer can be used to direct the planning process in the construction of
a persuasive argument. The operator is not complete, since it does not include
information concerning the current focus of the argument. In addition, the operator
description language used by the hierarchical planner rests on a semantics based on
information loss following the application of abstract operators. This makes operators
syntactically more complex than this example and explanation of the complete
encoding of a domain in this language is beyond the scope of this paper.
Persuade(H::agent, E::event)
Shell: Preconditions: disbelieves(H, E)
supports(E'::event, E)
disbelieves(H, supports(E', E))
Add: believes(H, E)
Delete: disbelieves(H, E)
disbelieves(H, supports(E', E))
Body: Goals: t1: believes(H, E')
t2: believes(H, supports(E', E))
t3: believes(H, E)
Ordering: t1 < t3, t2 < t3
Fig 5. Persuade Operator
In this example, all propositions are evaluated with respect to the speaker's
beliefs. The operator is abstract and contains sub-goals in its body. The preconditions
are not sub-goals but conditions: the operator cannot be applied unless the speaker
believes the preconditions in the state of application. The goals in the body are
ordered with respect to one another. These goals and the ordering between them are
revealed when the abstract plan containing this operator is refined. The operator
shows how sub-goals involved in the achievement of an effect can be encapsulated so
that the details of achieving them do not arise until the context in which they can be
most usefully considered has been created. The principle upon which the hierarchical
planning approach described in this paper is built is that, by postponing decisions,
many of the choices that would normally arise in resolving them can be excluded.
This is partly achieved by the ability to order goals in the bodies of abstract operators
which are unordered when they appear as preconditions in STRIPS-style operators.
A similar persuade operator can be applied when the hearer disbelieves E'
itself, but possibly accepts that E' supports E. If the hearer disbelieves E' then the
hearer can be inferred to believe NOT(E'), since failure to believe in either E or E'
implies that the hearer is undecided about both. An operator is required to undermine
the hearer's beliefs in NOT(E') so that the hearer will be ready to accept reasoned
arguments for belief in E'. This operator works by identifying the hearer's supports
for E' and making the hearer undecided about them. This can be done at each stage
either by undermining the hearer's belief in the supporting event or by undermining
the supporting connection between two events. The process terminates more quickly
if the supporting link is broken. If the hearer's beliefs in the events themselves are
tackled the process can involve recursive invocation of the undermining process.
The persuade, explain and inform operators, of which this one is a
simplified example, are applied at the AO level of the planning process. Operators
embodying the principles of logical argument, such as Modus Ponens, are introduced
at the AS level once the foundational and intentional structure of the argument is in
place. The operations performed at the EG level are not encoded as planning
operators since this level is a post-processing phase.
8. Conclusion
This paper has described an architecture for constructing extended arguments from
the highest level of pragmatic, intention-rich goals to a string of utterances, using a
core hierarchical planner employing operators embodying the principles of argument
construction. The planner is responsible for all levels of the construction and
organisation of the argument. The output of the planner is a detailed discourse plan
complete with annotations to indicate emphasis, mood, rhythm, and other features
characterising effective argument. This structure is given as input to the text
generation level of the system. This component of the architecture is required to
realise the abstract intentional structures into natural language utterances and is
provided by LOLITA, a large scale, domain independent natural language system, in
which a natural language generation algorithm is already implemented, [19], which
subsumes responsibility for solving certain low-level text generation planning
problems. The work described in this paper is still in progress and is currently
concentrated on the representation of discourse operators for use by the hierarchical
planner, the development of techniques applied at the EG level and the effects on
argument construction of the speaker's partial knowledge of the hearer's beliefs.
Future work will include the extension of the current framework to consider dialogue
planning between motivated agents.
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